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Abstract 
Traditionally used to designate bloody rituals practiced in so-called 
‘primitive societies’, the notion of sacrifice is commonly understood 
as a strategic investment in which the renunciation of something 
valuable is compensated by a more advantageous return. Sharing such 
a functionalist perspective, social theorists describe sacrifice as a means 
to renewing social and/or religious bonds through the transgression 
of social and/or religious boundaries. However, social theorists do not 
explain why men need to renew such bonds – i.e. what lies behind the 
human desire to unite with the divine and why violence exists in the 
first place – and ultimately leave unresolved the question of sacrifice’s 
deep origins. This article examines how two French theorists, namely 
Georges Bataille and René Girard, attempt to overcome the theoretical 
constraints faced by their predecessors and offer an innovative 
answer to the question of sacrifice’s deep origins, providing Western 
functionalist sacrifice theories with an unprecedented depth. 
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metaphysics, and film studies, to name but a few disciplines – but also the 
popular imagination. In both academic writings and popular discourses, 
sacrifice is commonly understood as a strategic investment in which the 
renunciation to something valuable is compensated by a more advantageous 
return (Mayblin 2014: 346-347). Like the chess player sacrifices the queen in 
order to win the game, parents sacrifice their comfort for their baby’s wellbeing 
and soldiers sacrifice their lives for their country. 
As Western social theory elucidates, with the notable contributions of 
Durkheim, Mauss, Frazer, Robertson Smith and more recently Turner and 
Bloch among many others, such a functionalist approach to sacrifice derives 
from the utilitarian understanding of sacrificial rituals across cultures and 
throughout history (Carter 2006: 2-4). Sacrificial rituals are indeed often 
described as a form of religious investment resonant of the Latin phrase do ut 
des, ‘I give so that you will give’. In line with Mauss’ theory of the gift, which 
highlights that receiving a gift implies an obligation to reciprocate, sacrifice 
establishes a long-term relation of mutual gift-giving – in other words, of debts 
and credits – between men and the divine (Mauss 1954: 12-13). With this in 
mind, the sacrificial destruction and consecration of a victim, thereby offered 
to the Gods, is thought to endear men to Gods and attract the latter’s favours 
(Hubert & Mauss 1964: 9). Accordingly, sacrificial rituals consist of the strategic 
transgression of a boundary – that delimiting of the sacred from the profane, 
through the victim’s consecration. This allows the renewal of a bond – uniting 
men to Gods –  which I will refer to throughout this article as a ‘religious bond’. 
Moreover, for social theorists such as Robertson Smith, Durkheim, Mauss 
and more recently Merton, if sacrifice’s expected function – or, as Merton puts 
it, ‘manifest function’ (1957: 60-69) – is to establish a link between men and the 
divine, its ‘latent function’– i.e. function that is neither intended nor recognized 
– is to reunite men with their fellow community members (Ibid.; Durkheim 
1973: 336; 340). For these theorists, sacrifice is first and foremost a social 
mechanism permitting the regulation of violence within human communities. 
The sacrificial killing is described as a major, yet institutionalized, transgression 
of social norms and prohibitions, which, through the catharsis it generates, 
momentarily purges men from their violent desires and reaffirms the social 
bond. Regardless of their insistence on sacrifice’s latent or manifest function 
then, social theorists tend to describe sacrifice as a technique of renewal of 
a social and/or religious bond through the transgression of a social and/or 
religious boundary.
However, several theorists denounced the functionalist socio-
anthropological theories of sacrifice as superficial. As the French theorist 
Georges Bataille argues,‘[t]hese explanations accounted for the effects of 
sacrifice; they do not tell us what forced men to kill their own kind in religious 
ceremonies’ (1986: 62). Similarly unsatisfied, the French theorist René Girard 
regrets that these accounts ‘have nothing to say about the origins of sacrificial 
practice’ (1979: 89). Social theorists indeed elucidate sacrifice in terms of its 
function, as a means to renewing social and/or religious bonds, but do not 
seek to explain why men need to renew such bonds – that is to say, what lies 
behind men’s desire to unite with the divine and why violence exists in the 
first place. As Bataille concludes, social theories of sacrifice tend to ‘reduce the 
why of things to contingency’ (1986: 62). For Tiina Arppe, such a tendency 
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can be explained by the scientific constraints of social theory, which prevent 
socio-anthropologists and sociologists from raising – let alone addressing – the 
‘unscientific’ questions that lie behind sacrifice’s function (2009: 36). 
Throughout their respective works, Bataille and Girard repeatedly claimed 
their will to, as Bataille puts it, ‘get to the bottom of things’ by addressing the 
questions their predecessors left unresolved (1986: 62). This article examines 
how they attempt to do so through the overcoming of the scientific constraints 
of socio-anthropological theories. On the whole, I will try to demonstrate 
that both theorists successfully elucidate the deep ‘unscientific’ origins of 
sacrificial practice, ultimately providing Western functionalist sacrifice theories 
with an unprecedented depth and bridging the gap between two apparently 
incompatible socio-anthropological and metaphysical approaches to sacrifice. 
Economical Versus “Aneconomical” Sacrifice
When looking at René Girard’s sacrifice theory, it first appears that, despite 
an innovative insistence on the mimetic nature of human relations, Girard’s 
theory remains an example of traditional functionalist logic. In line with 
his predecessors, Girard indeed describes sacrifice as a social mechanism 
permitting the regulation of violence within societies.1 Violence, Girard 
argues, ensues from the mimetic relation of jealousy and rivalry that develops 
between community members and escalates until it generalizes into a violence 
of all against all (1979: 79-81). For Girard, men originally survived their own 
violence through the natural setting up of the scapegoat mechanism, which 
consists of the polarisation of this violence of all against all, onto one scapegoat, 
which is violently evicted from the community (Ibid.: 81-82). The cathartic 
power of such an event offers a partial fulfilment of men’s violent desires and 
momentarily reaffirms the social bond. Set up as the ritualized re-enactment 
of the scapegoat mechanism, sacrifice thus works as a ‘technique of cathartic 
appeasement’, based on the transgression of social prohibitions – through the 
killing of a surrogate victim – which renews the social bond (Ibid.: 99; 102). As 
such, Girard’s mimetic theory seems perfectly in line with the functionalist logic 
of his predecessors, also sharing its limits. As Girard insists, ‘[his] theory should 
be approached […] as one approaches any scientific hypothesis’ (1979: 316). 
Like any social theory of sacrifice, Girard’s theory thus seems condemned to 
overlook what exceeds science’s scope, including the deep origins of sacrificial 
practice.
Unlike Girard, Georges Bataille never sought to build a scientific theory of 
sacrifice. On the contrary, preferring existential reflection to the use of scientific 
methods, Bataille insists throughout his works on the onto-metaphysical 
importance of sacrifice, which cannot be otherwise explored than by, as Bataille 
puts it, ‘bring[ing] into play the ultimate question of existence’ (1986: 64). 
Thereby liberated from any scientific constraint, Bataille is able to address, and 
indeed offers an answer to, metaphysical questions related to sacrifice, including 
that of its raison d’être. As Bataille argues, sacrifice exists simply because it is 
the very expression of what it means to be human, that is to say, to be neither 
an animal nor a God. For Bataille, the world is divided into two spheres: the 
transcendent order of things in which men live and the immanent realm of 
the sacred. Whereas the former is ruled by the restricted economy, which is 
turned towards the satisfaction of men’s animal needs and hence governed by 
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imperative utility, the latter escapes both utility and finitude. For Bataille, men 
have a particular status in relation to these two spheres: unlike other living 
beings in the transcendent order of things, they are not merely dominated by 
their physical needs and are thus able to make autonomous or, as Bataille puts 
it, ‘sovereign’ gestures, that exceed the rule of restricted economy (1990: 25). 
However, unlike divine entities, men’s sovereignty is not absolute for it remains 
subjected to the inherent limits of the transcendent realm in which men live. 
In Bataille’s theory, sacrifice is described as the very expression of such an 
in-between status, for sacrifice is a sovereign act that makes human finitude 
manifest. 
On the one hand, adopting what has been called an ‘aneconomical’ 
perspective in opposition with his socio-anthropological predecessors (Keenan 
2005: 1), Bataille insists that sacrifice is not valuable for its supposed function, 
but in itself. For Bataille, sacrifice has no function and it is precisely why 
sacrifice is so important. Having no function, the sacrificial killing consists in 
the destruction for nothing of a valuable victim, an act of pure loss expenditure 
that fundamentally goes against the utilitarian rule of the restricted economy 
and hence appears ‘a sovereign, autonomous manner of being’ (Bataille 1990: 
25). As such sacrifice makes men’s sovereignty manifest. Yet, on the other hand, 
because sacrifice consists in the spectacle of what Bataille calls ‘life’s necessary 
game with death’ through the public killing of a victim (1986: 62), sacrifice 
also sheds light on human finitude. For Bataille then, ‘[t]he sacrificial gesture is 
what [Man] humanly is’, for it makes men’s separation from both animality and 
immanence manifest (1990: 25). With this statement, Bataille offers an answer 
to sacrifice’s ‘unscientific’ origins. 
However, one might object that such an answer does not match the question 
left unresolved by socio-anthropological theories of sacrifice. Whereas, unlike 
Girard, Bataille offers an explanation to sacrifice’s deep origins, he does so 
adopting a perspective that is incompatible with the functionalism of socio-
anthropological theories of sacrifice. Indeed, the question left to answer in the 
latter is that of the ‘unscientific’ origins of the sacrificial dynamics of renewal 
of bonds through the transgression of boundaries – in other words, why men 
find the need to renew divine and social bonds. On the contrary, describing 
sacrifice aneconomically as pure loss expenditure or, as Bataille puts it, ‘the 
antithesis of production’ (1989: 49), Bataille’s theory denies any return on 
sacrificial investment. For Bataille, sacrifice is inoperative: it is a transgression 
of boundaries that however produces nothing, let alone the renewal of bonds. As 
Bataille insists, sacrifice is ‘the fall into the void, and nothing, neither in the fall 
nor in the void is revealed’ (1988: 50, emphasis added). Accordingly, Bataille’s 
theory does not answer the question left unresolved by socio-anthropological 
functionalist theories of sacrifice, for it responds to an opposite imperative of 
inoperativity. On the whole, being limited by their respective attachment to 
sacrifice’s inoperativity and scientific objectivity, neither Bataille nor Girard 
seems able to explain why men seek to renew the bonds that unite them with 
the divine and with their fellow community members.
‘The New Darwin of the Human Sciences’
A closer look at Girard’s theory, however, casts doubt upon his claimed 
scientific objectivity (de Heusch 1982: 19; White 1978: 4-5; 7). In early 
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works such as Deceit, Desire and the Novel but also later in Violence and the 
Sacred, Girard builds his understanding of sacrifice on the sacrificial motifs 
and patterns he identifies in famous novels by Proust, Dostoevsky, Stendhal 
or Flaubert, in Sophoclean and Euripidean tragedy, as well as in Christian 
Gospels and Freudian myths, among other cultural sources. Rather than 
using anthropological data and scientific reasoning, Girard adopts what can 
be described as a cultural perspective, based on existential reflection and 
literary criticism. Moreover, in his later works such as in Things Hidden Since 
the Foundation of the World (1987), theological ponderings underlie and even 
often outweigh anthropological analyses. As a result, many anthropologists 
and scholars, particularly in France, refuse to recognize Girard’s work as 
anthropological and prefer to classify it as a theoretical hybrid, at the crossroad 
between literary critique, cultural theory, theology and philosophical 
anthropology (de Heusch 1982; White 1978). Stressing Girard’s interdisciplinary 
perspective, Michel Serres received Girard into the Académie Française as ‘the 
new Darwin of the human sciences’ (2009: 5). 
Despite his claimed scientific objectivity and socio-anthropological 
approach, Girard thus appears theoretically flexible enough to address questions 
that exceed science’s scope. One crucial ‘unscientific’ question Girard elucidates 
throughout his works is that of the origins of violence. Girard’s first insights on 
that issue can be found in Deceit, Desire and the Novel in which Girard argues 
that human desire is fundamentally imitative (1965: 83). More precisely, Girard 
highlights that man imitates an Other which he or she thinks is metaphysically 
autonomous; any demand arising from the Other’s self indeed seems to be 
satisfied by his or her self (Ibid.: 56). However, as Girard points out, the Other’s 
metaphysical autonomy is an illusion: since men are inextricably limited, 
autonomy is out of human reach (Ibid.: 16; 283). Men are thus condemned 
to imitate each other in a desperate attempt to reach a state of fundamentally 
impossible metaphysical autonomy. As Anthony Traylor suggests, such desire 
to escape the ‘curse’ of mankind, as Girard puts it (1965: 271), is a ‘defining 
mark of the human condition’ (2014): being human means simultaneously 
being limited and incessantly trying to overcome human finitude through the 
imitation of an illusion. 
In Violence and the Sacred, Girard describes violence as a destructive 
evolution of human mimetic interaction (1979: 79-81). Linking the 
metaphysical reflection on human desire developed in Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel with the socio-anthropological analyses of Violence and the Sacred, it 
thus appears that violence is an expression of men’s onto-metaphysical nature.2 
By extension, sacrifice’s social function – the regulation of violence – is a 
response to the destructive potential of men’s metaphysical identity. As such, 
Girard offers a cross-disciplinary answer to the ‘why’ of sacrifice’s function: 
men need to renew the social bond because the latter is threatened by human 
nature. This is why James Alison insists that what one can learn from Girard’s 
interdisciplinary theory is that ‘[w]e didn’t invent sacrifice; sacrifice invented 
us’ (2013). In other words, men did not invent sacrifice as a mechanism to 
serve future ends; sacrifice invented us for it is what allows us to exist as human 
beings. In a way which is reminiscent of Bataille’s aneconomical valorization of 
sacrifice as ‘what [Man] humanly is’ (1990: 25), Girard shows that behind the 
social function of the sacrificial dynamics of transgression of boundaries and 
renewal of bonds lies a metaphysical raison d’être: sacrifice makes human nature 
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possible and manifest. However unlike Bataille, Girard manages to combine a 
socio-anthropological approach with the theoretical flexibility of metaphysical 
reflection and, crucially, makes a functionalist perspective compatible with what 
I consider an aneconomical undertone, allowing him to successfully elucidate 
the so far overlooked metaphysical raison d’être of the sacrificial dynamics of 
renewal of bonds through the transgression of boundaries.
Imperative Inoperativity and Unavoidable Utility
However, as is clear from the many critical debates it has sparked over the past 
few decades, Bataille’s systematic rejection of functionalism is highly nuanced. 
Indeed, when looking at Bataille’s theory in more detail, it appears that, 
contradicting his claim that sacrifice produces nothing, two sacrificial outcomes 
can be identified. On the one hand, one can sense throughout Bataille’s theory 
that sacrifice establishes a form of bond between men and the sacred through 
the exposure of men to immanence. As it has already been highlighted, what 
separates immanence from transcendence in Bataille’s theory is the fact that the 
former exceeds the rules of imperative utility while the latter submits to it. As a 
sovereign act performed within the limits of the transcendent order of things, 
sacrifice brings immanent meaning within the transcendent order of things and 
thereby exposes men to immanence, creating what can be described as a bond 
between men and the sacred. 
On the other hand, Bataille acknowledges throughout his works that 
sacrifice momentarily dismisses the violence that puts humanity at risk, 
which Zeynep Direk calls ‘transcendent violence’ (2004: 30). In a way which 
is reminiscent of Marx, Bataille argues that humanity is threatened by the 
intrinsic alienating violence of the restricted economy. Under such an economy 
of imperative utility, men indeed lose their status of subject to become mere 
objects of production. As Bataille highlights, ‘[t]he farmer is not a man: he 
is a plough of the one who eats the bread. At the limit, the act of the eater 
himself is already agricultural labour, to which he furnishes the energy’ (1989: 
42). However, Bataille argues, since sacrifice precisely breaches the rule of 
utility, it ‘draws the victim out of the world of utility and restores it to that 
of unintelligible caprice’ (Ibid.: 43), in other words, to immanence. As such, 
sacrifice momentarily dismisses the alienating transcendent violence and de-
objectifies the victim, as well as, through the cathartic power of such event, the 
entire community (Ibid.: 43-4). Crucially, for Bataille, men’s renewed awareness 
of their humanity, which they discover by contrast with the objects they had 
become, develops as a contagious communication between men, putting them 
into relation and creating a form of social bond (Bataille 1988: 57; 194).
In his works, Bataille thus acknowledges that sacrifice has three effects, 
which in fact matches the two social and religious functions identified by social 
theory: sacrifice exposes men to immanence, creating a form of bond between 
men and the sacred, dismisses the violence that puts humanity at risks and 
initiates the contagion of human self-consciousness, which unites men within 
a form of social bond. However, as it has been pointed out, Bataille’s theory 
is particularly famous for describing sacrifice as ‘the antithesis of production’ 
(1989: 49). The question that remains then is whether, for Bataille, sacrifice 
produces something or not. This is, I think, the cornerstone of Bataille’s 
complex theory; what makes it so powerful and yet equivocal. Paradoxically, 
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Bataille simultaneously conveys within his theory the simultaneous imperative 
inoperativity and unavoidable utility of sacrifice. My sense is that the clue to 
such a complex debate can be found in the difference that Bataille maintains 
throughout his works – not without difficulty – between sacrifice’s effect and 
sacrifice’s function. 
As I have already pointed out, Bataille, throughout his works, argues that 
sacrifice is ‘what [Man] humanly is’, for sacrifice is, like Man, paradoxically 
both sovereign and limited (1990: 25). As a sovereign act, sacrifice escapes 
the imperative utility of restricted economy, which is why Bataille insists that 
sacrifice is ‘the antithesis of production’ (1989: 49). However, this is not to say 
that sacrifice produces nothing: it simply means that sacrifice produces nothing 
intended to serve future ends. Indeed, because sacrifice is submitted to the 
material finite conditions of the transcendent order of things, it inevitably has 
practical effects upon the latter, which however are produced without expected 
function since they ensue from a sovereign act. Here lies the subtlety of Bataille’s 
theory. As Bataille further elucidates in ‘Hegel, Death and Sacrifice’, sacrifice’s 
effects only take useful meaning once interpreted by human intelligence, which 
Bataille describes as a ‘function[...] of servile labors’ (1990: 25). As Bataille 
argues, ‘to the extent that discourse informs it, what is sovereign is given in 
terms of servitude’ (Ibid.: 25-26, Bataille’s italics). Human intelligence thus only 
interprets the effects of sacrifice a posteriori, misunderstanding the real intrinsic 
importance of sacrifice. As Bataille concludes, ‘the pure revelation of Man to 
himself […] passes from sovereignty to the primacy of servile ends’ (Ibid.: 26). 
Accordingly, Bataille does not elucidate the deep origins of sacrifice’s function 
through an exploration of the metaphysical roots of such function, like Girard 
does, but through the analysis of men’s functionalist intelligence.
For Bataille, if sacrifice has been used throughout history and across 
cultures as a means to renew the bond uniting men with the divine and with 
their fellow community members, it is simply because men gave a useful 
meaning to sacrifice’s effects – hence a useful raison d’être to sacrificial 
practice. Men interpret sacrifice as useful for the survival of their societies – 
which corresponds to sacrifice’s traditional social function – and for possibly 
overcoming their unbearable finitude, through the establishment of a link 
between humanity and the divine, which corresponds to sacrifice’s traditional 
religious function. To paraphrase Bataille, ‘what forced men to kill their own 
kind in religious ceremonies’ is thus both the fact that sacrifice is what being 
human means, and that men interpreted such human truth in useful terms. The 
sacrificial practice appears, in Bataille’s theory, to be simultaneously driven by 
an aneconomical and economical imperative (1986: 62). Bataille thus manages 
to conciliate within his theory both the deep aneconomical onto-metaphysical 
raison d’être of sacrifice – the fact that it is ‘what [Man] humanly is’ (1990: 25) – 
and the traditional functionalist understanding of sacrifice, which he elucidates. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, throughout their respective works, both Bataille and Girard 
propose compelling methods through which one can ‘get to the bottom 
of things’ when it comes to the question of sacrifice’s raison d’être (Bataille 
1986: 62). While, for Girard, one can trace sacrifice’s deep origins back to the 
metaphysical origins of violence, which lie in the unbearable yet inextricable 
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finitude of human existence, Bataille suggests that sacrifice corresponds 
to ‘what [Man] humanly is’, as much as the functionalist interpretation of 
sacrifice derives from what being human means. As such, even if they ensue 
from two opposite perspectives, corresponding to two different traditions of 
aneconomism and functionalism, Bataille and Girard’s theories reach a similar 
conclusion: sacrifice is constitutive of being human. Making a step towards one 
another, Bataille and Girard account for the traditional socio-anthropological 
analyses of their predecessors, while making them both more nuanced and 
comprehensive through the identification of sacrifice’s metaphysical and 
aneconomical raison d’être. In so doing, they provide Western functionalist 
sacrifice theories with an unprecedented depth and bridge the gap between two 
apparently incompatible socio-anthropological and metaphysical approaches to 
sacrifice.
Endnotes
1 Focusing on sacrifice’s social function, Girard only pays little attention 
to sacrifice’s manifest religious function identified by his predecessors. For 
Girard,‘[s]acrifice deals with humankind, and it is in human terms [not 
religious terms] that we must attempt to comprehend it’ (1979: 90). 
2 This is not to say that mimetic violence is the only expression of 
human nature – even if it is the most common one. In Things Hidden Since 
the Foundation of the World, Girard argues that Jesus’ death highlighted the 
possibility of a mimesis of love, which should replace men’s usually  
violent mimesis. 
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